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I. Introduction 
The European Union is currently pushing investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in three 
proposed trade agreements. The most significant is the least mature: the proposed Europe-U.S. 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), for which no public text is available.1 
For the other two agreements, a public text is available, although the agreements have not been 
signed or ratified. These are the proposed Canada-Europe Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) 2 and the proposed Europe-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA).3 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the CETA and FTA models of ISDS based on general 
criteria of independence, fairness, openness, and balance. The main conclusion reached is that 
there is no significant difference between the CETA and FTA when it comes to ISDS. With the 
qualified exception of the criterion of openness, both agreements fall well short of satisfying the 
criteria. As such, neither agreement offers a significant improvement on the U.S. model of ISDS 
and, in some respects, the Commission’s approach would make things worse, especially on the 
criterion of balance. 
The CETA and FTA also provide evidence to assess the extent to which the Commission would 
accept the U.S. model of ISDS in the TTIP. On this issue, both agreements demonstrate that the 
Commission is prepared to accept the U.S. model almost entirely, especially in the form adopted 
since the early 2000s. Where there are variations from the U.S. model in the CETA and FTA, the 
Commission can be expected to shift further toward the U.S. model in the TTIP due to the 
obviously greater bargaining power of the U.S. relative to Canada and Singapore. 
1 European Commission, “Public consultation on modalities for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP” 
(undated) [TTIP consultation text], available online: European Commission 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf (last accessed 8 October 2014); 
all page number references are to the online pdf version in which the pages are not numbered.  
2 Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): Consolidated CETA 
Text, available online: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada) 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/ceta-aecg/text-
texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng (last accessed 8 October 2014). 
3 Text of the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA), available online: European Commission 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 (last accessed 1 June 2015). 
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Thus, the CETA and FTA, viewed alongside the TTIP negotiations, should be understood as an 
effort by the Commission to expand massively the scope of ISDS.4 For instance, using the U.S. 
economy as a proxy, TTIP alone would extend ISDS coverage of international investment flows 
by about 300 per cent compared to current ISDS coverage based on existing treaties. That is, 
TTIP would cover 50-60% of investment flows in and out of the U.S. whereas current treaties of 
the U.S. cover 15-20% of such investment flows. Besides TTIP, a few other treaties pursued by 
the Commission or the U.S.—the Trans-Pacific Partnership, EU-China investment treaty, and 
U.S.-China investment treaty– would expand coverage of ISDS to the great majority of 
investment flows worldwide. 
 
II. Evaluation of the CETA and FTA 
 
In this section, the CETA and FTA models of ISDS are evaluated against five criteria, each 
reflecting a core concern about ISDS—or, more precisely, the arbitration mechanism at the heart 
of ISDS—to decide the legality of sovereign conduct and re-allocate public money to foreign 
investors.5  The first three criteria—independence, fairness, and openness—reflect key elements 
of a judicial process, particularly a judicial process used for the final resolution of disputes about 
sovereign conduct and public funds.6 The remaining criterion—balance—relates to the allocation 
of substantive rights and responsibilities in treaties that authorize ISDS.   
 
A. Independence 
 
To be independent in the manner of a court, ISDS would need to incorporate the conventional 
institutional safeguards of judicial independence. For example, it would need to ensure: 
 
(a) security of tenure for the adjudicator; 
(b) a set salary for the adjudicator; 
(c) an objective method of case assignment such as lottery or rotation; 
(d) a prohibition on outside lawyering by the adjudicator; and 
(e) a judicial process to resolve conflict-of-interest claims. 
 
                                                          
4 These approximate figures were calculated based on existing investment treaty coverage of country-by-
country inward and outward FDI flows for the U.S. in 2012 from the data provided in Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “StatExtracts: FDI flows by partner country”, available 
online: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER. The figures do not 
account for the possibility of forum-shopping by foreign investors which is difficult to measure and 
handled in different ways by arbitrators and existing treaties, but which could expand existing ISDS 
coverage. 
5 G. Van Harten, “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law” in SW Schill 
(ed) International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010); G Van Harten, 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 159-75. 
6 For an elaboration, see G. Van Harten, “The EC and UNCTAD reform agendas: Do they ensure 
independence, openness, and fairness in investor-state arbitration?” in M. Krajewski and S. Hindelang 
(eds) Shifting Paradigms in International Investment Law: More Balanced, Less Isolated, Increasingly 
Diversified (under submission to Oxford University Press). 
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These institutional safeguards are standard features of domestic courts and other international 
tribunals that resolve disputes concerning the legality of sovereign conduct. ISDS does not 
incorporate these safeguards, allowing instead for: 
 
(a) case-by-case appointment of adjudicators; 
(b) case-by-case (i.e. for-profit) payment of adjudicators; 
(c) executive control over default case assignments for adjudicators; 
(d) allowances for outside legal work in ISDS by adjudicators; and 
(e) executive control over conflict-of-interest challenges against adjudicators. 
 
Neither the CETA nor the FTA would alter this structure of ISDS. As a result, both agreements 
fail to address the lack of independence in ISDS, contemplating instead a process that gives rise 
to reasonable suspicions of adjudicative bias that would taint all outcomes in ISDS.7 
 
These suspicions of bias can operate in favour of a country, a foreign investor, or other parties, 
depending on the circumstances. For example, because ISDS arbitrators are appointed case-by-
case and paid (lucratively) by the appointment, all of the arbitrators depend financially on 
whoever can trigger an arbitration. Under investment treaties, only foreign investors have this 
triggering power and only states must pay compensation for violations of the treaty. Thus, ISDS 
arbitrators have an evident incentive to favour foreign investors, especially those most able to 
bring claims.8 
 
Similarly, an ISDS arbitrator—who lacks secure tenure and is interested in future 
appointments—is necessarily dependent on whoever has the default power over the 
appointment of arbitrators when a foreign investor and state do not agree on the presiding 
arbitrator or when either does not appoint its own arbitrator. On this issue, the CETA and FTA 
give default appointing authority to the Secretary General of the World Bank’s International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).9 The ICSID Secretary-General is an 
executive official not a judicial actor. It is fundamentally inconsistent with judicial independence 
to allow an executive official to choose who will decide a case after learning who has sued whom 
and in what context. This structure allows the executive official to ensure that sensitive cases are 
kept in safe hands, according to the politics of the claim. 
 
The most significant step in the CETA and FTA concerning the lack of independence in ISDS is 
the proposed incorporation of a code of conduct for ISDS arbitrators.10 Even so, this is a very 
limited step due to the form taken by the code, which would not incorporate any of the 
conventional safeguards mentioned above. The code would not even preclude ISDS arbitrators 
from working on the side as ISDS lawyers, which is an obvious contribution a code of conduct 
could make. Further, the code would be policed by an executive official based on a process of 
complaints filed by disputing parties.11 This is inadequate in various ways. For example, it 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.25(2) and (3); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.21(2). 
10 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.42(2); FTA (n 3 above) Annex 9-B. 
11 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.25(10); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.21(10). 
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assumes that the disputing parties would be able to uncover the outside counsel work of an ISDS 
arbitrator, even though ISDS arbitrations are in some cases entirely secret.12 Unless an 
arbitrator declares a potential conflict, therefore, the affected disputing party may have no way 
of knowing about the arbitrator’s role as counsel. 
 
The CETA and FTA would come closest to addressing some aspects of the lack of independence 
in ISDS by moving tentatively toward a roster of arbitrators.13 A set roster of adjudicators could 
be a positive step toward a judicial process. However, the roster in the CETA and FTA is clearly 
insufficient because: (a) the roster would not apply to all arbitrators appointed to the tribunal; 
(b) an executive official retains the power to choose who is appointed from the roster case-by-
case; and (c) the executive official would be able to appoint arbitrators from outside of the roster 
if the states parties to the treaty did not agree on the roster’s membership.14 For two decades, 
this last loophole has foiled the similar roster in NAFTA investor-state arbitration.15 
 
The failure to ensure judicial independence in ISDS is a fundamental flaw in the CETA and FTA. 
Without the basic safeguards of judicial independence, ISDS outcomes as a whole will lack 
integrity regardless of the treaty text or the arbitrators’ goodwill. In essence, the CETA and FTA 
allow foreign investors to take final adjudicative power from courts and give it to a small cadre 
of ISDS arbitrators and executive officials, none of whom are institutionally independent in the 
manner of a judge.  
 
B. Fairness 
 
ISDS arbitration is arguably unfair for many reasons but the most precise one is procedural. To 
be fair, an adjudicative process must allow any party whose rights or interests are affected by the 
adjudication to have full standing in the process. This is a straightforward and longstanding 
principle of fairness.16 If all affected parties could not have standing in the process, an 
adjudicator would not be required (and in a position) to hear all sides to the dispute. 
 
ISDS does not ensure this basic right for all affected parties. For that reason, it is unfair. Instead, 
ISDS allows a right of full standing for claimant investors and respondent governments only.17 
No one else whose rights or interests are affected can obtain such rights, regardless of the extent 
to which their rights or interests are affected and regardless of their perspective.18 
 
                                                          
12 The problem of complete secrecy appears most acute in arbitration under the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) arbitration rules. G. Van Harten, “A total lack of transparency” Canadian Lawyer (24 
October 2011). 
13 TTIP consultation text (n 1 above) 13. 
14 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.25 (2) to (4); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.21 (2) and (4). 
15 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (17 December 1992; 32 ILM 296 and 605; entered into 
force 1 January 1994), Article 1124(4). 
16 G. Van Harten, G. Heckman, D.J. Mullan, J. Promislow, Administrative Law – Cases, Text, and 
Materials, 7th edn (Toronto: Emond, 2015) 73-74. 
17 CETA (n 2 above), Article X.3; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.14(2)(a) (definition of “disputing parties”). 
18 For an indication of cases in which outside parties were affected by an ISDS proceeding, see Van Harten 
(n 6 above). 
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In response to this problem—and drawing on the U.S. model of ISDS since the early 2000s—the 
CETA and FTA allow limited third-party (also known as amicus) representation in ISDS.19 This 
“reform” falls well short of what is required for basic fairness in ISDS. Amicus representation 
does not require an ISDS tribunal to give full standing to all persons with a direct interest in the 
proceeding.20 Amicus representation merely lets a party take part in proceedings in a limited 
way, to the extent and as authorized by the arbitrators.21 For ISDS to be fair, it would need to 
provide an automatic right of full standing for all affected parties.22 
 
As a result, the Commission’s approach to ISDS continues to allow arbitrators to make decisions 
that may affect other parties—whether private actors or public entities—without hearing from 
them. This unfairness can be addressed only by requiring public notice of all ISDS claims and by 
allowing time for other affected parties to apply, in a judicial process, for full standing. 
 
C. Openness 
 
Courts are open in the sense that all documents and hearings before the court are presumptively 
public, subject to specifically-enumerated and judicially-approved exceptions. Courts are open 
to allow for public accountability and to support the independence and fairness of the court. In 
contrast, ISDS is not fully open and, in some instances, it is completely closed because even the 
mere existence of the arbitration is kept secret. 
 
The lack of openness in ISDS has been criticized since at last the late 1990s when the foreign 
investor lawsuits began to explode, most notably under NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty.23 
In the case of NAFTA, the Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. governments responded by releasing a 
joint interpretation of NAFTA in 2001 that made clear that each government could disclosure 
ISDS documents and, subsequently, by putting provisions on openness in new trade and 
investment agreements.24 Similarly, in 2010, UNCITRAL issued new transparency rules for 
                                                          
19 CETA (n 2 above) Article X-35(1)(b)(ii); FTA (n 3 above) Annex 9-C (Article 3). 
20 P Wieland, “Why the Amicus Curia Institution is Ill-suited to address Indigenous Peoples’ Rights before 
Investor-State Arbitration Tribunals: Glamis Gold and the Right of Intervention” (2011) 3 Trade, Law & 
Dev’t 334, 344-5 and 359-60; N. Blackaby and C. Richard, “Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in 
Investment Arbitration?” in M Waibel et al (eds) The Backlash against Investment Arbitration (Austin: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2010) 259-66. 
21 In actual arbitrations, amicus representation has been used rarely and with significant restrictions; 
Wieland, ibid, 341-4. 
22 E Levine, “Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The Implications of an Increase in 
Third-Party Participation” (2012) 29 Berkeley J Int’l L 200, 208-14; A Salazar, ‘Defragmenting 
International Investment Law to Protect Citizen-Consumers: The Role of Amici Curiae and Public 
Interest Groups’ (Osgoode Hall Law School, Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy Research 
Paper No 6/2013, 2013) 4-8. 
23 G. Van Harten, Sold Down the Yangtze: Canada’s Lopsided Investment Deal with China (IIAPP/ self-
published, 2015) chapters 11 and 21. 
24 Free Trade Commission (NAFTA), Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (31 July 
2001), online: Government of Canada http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/NAFTA-Interpr.aspx (last accessed June 1, 2015). Canada 
recently pulled back from this position in the Canada-China BIT by permitting the host state to an 
arbitration claim to withhold all documents other than awards from disclosure where it decides this is in 
the public interest. Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People’s 
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ISDS pursuant to the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, although these reforms were not extended to 
new ISDS arbitrations under the many existing treaties that authorize ISDS under the 
UNCITRAL rules.25 
 
Allowances for secrecy, at the option of a disputing party, may be appropriate in commercial 
arbitration where the implications of a dispute are often limited to the disputing parties. Yet, 
such secrecy are is fundamentally misplaced in investment treaty arbitration where the 
arbitrators regularly review the decisions of legislatures, governments, and courts in matters of 
public interest and where they can award massive amounts of compensation from public funds. 
These are among the highest powers that any adjudicator can wield.26 To support the role of 
adjudication in a democracy, such powers must be exercised publicly, subject to judicially-
approved exceptions. 
 
The CETA and FTA go a long way to addressing the lack of openness in ISDS. Following the U.S. 
model since the early 2000s, both agreements require ISDS documents and hearings to be made 
public.27 The requirement for publication of documents, in particular, is close to comprehensive 
in that it includes a foreign investor’s original request for consultation or arbitration, all the 
submissions of the parties, and all tribunal decisions.28 
 
Yet, the CETA and FTA still have limitations in terms of openness. Most importantly, it is up to 
ISDS arbitrators, not judges, to decide whether documents or hearings should be kept secret.29 
Also, under the CETA and FTA, a foreign investor could threaten a claim—and a settlement may 
be reached involving payment of public money and or changes to legislative, government, or 
judicial decisions—entirely in secret. To address this issue, the CETA and FTA would need to 
make clear that the fact and terms of a settlement arrived at by a state, following an invocation 
of the treaty, would be reported publicly.  
 
D. Balance 
 
I shift now from the process of ISDS to its structural design, referring in particular to the 
allocation of substantive rights and responsibilities. To be balanced, I suggest that ISDS would 
need to affirm the right to regulate of states alongside the elaborate rights and protections that it 
gives to foreign investors. Further, ISDS would need to incorporate responsibilities for foreign 
investors that are actionable in the manner of their rights. This is a formal or thin version of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed 9 September 
2012, entered in force 1 October 2014, online: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/fipa-apie/china-text-chine.aspx?lang=eng (last accessed 12 October 2014), Article 
28(1). 
25 UNCITRAL, Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (New York: United 
Nations, 2014). 
26 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
chapter 3. 
27 CETA (n 5 above) Article X.33. 
28 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.33(1), which incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (above n 26), as supplemented by CETA Article X.33(2). 
29 CETA (n 5 above) Article X.33 (4) to (5); FTA, Annex 9-C, Article 4(7) and (11). 
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concept of balance because, with the exception of the clarity of any affirmation of the state’s 
right to regulate, it does not engage the issue of the appropriate content and extent of foreign 
investors’ rights and responsibilities.30 
 
In the CETA and FTA, and virtually as a general rule under investment treaties, ISDS is 
imbalanced. On the one hand, it delivers a suite of wide-ranging and highly-enforceable foreign 
investor rights and corresponding responsibilities for countries. On the other hand, it lacks a 
clear affirmation of the state’s right to regulate and lacks any substantive and actionable 
responsibilities for foreign investors.  
 
The responsibilities assumed by states in ISDS are wide-ranging. They include the 
responsibilities to submit to ISDS arbitrator power and pay compensation as ordered by the 
arbitrators, where a majority of the arbitrators decide that the state did not treat a foreign 
investor fairly and equitably, did not pay sufficient compensation for a direct expropriation or 
general regulation, discriminated in favour of domestic investors, or inappropriately limited 
transfers of capital, for example.31 Yet, the responsibilities are rarely if ever accompanied by a 
clear and unqualified affirmation of the state’s general right to exercise its regulatory role in 
relation to foreign investors.32 
 
Investment treaties could affirm this general right of the state alongside the state’s 
responsibilities. That is, the right could be stated clearly in the treaty, without broad limitations, 
and applied to all of the state’s obligations to protect foreign investors.33 However, In the CETA 
and FTA investment chapters, the right to regulate is not stated at all, let alone clearly as a right 
of the state. 
 
Instead, in the case of the CETA, the right to regulate is mentioned in an aspirational statement 
in the preamble and in two other chapters (on labour and the environment, thus preserving the 
state’s flexibility in the face of international labour and environmental standards) not including 
the investment chapter.34 In the case of the FTA, it is mentioned only in two chapters (on 
services and the environment).35 This approach to the right to regulate actually undermines the 
reliability of that right in the investment chapter, if the right is thought to be implicit there 
somehow, because it creates an inference that the parties to the treaty intended to make the 
right substantive and effective only in the chapters of the agreement that incorporate it clearly 
                                                          
30 For a cautious approach to the issue of foreign investor responsibilities, see P.T. Muchlinski, 
Multinational Enterprises & the Law, 2d edn (Oxford: OUP, 2007), chapter 3. 
31 e.g. CETA (n 2 above) Articles X.6, X.9, X.11, and X.12. 
32 J.A. VanDuzer, P. Simons, and G. Mayeda, Integrating Sustainable Development into International 
Investment Agreements: A Guide for Developing Countries (London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2012) 
287-398. 
33 e.g. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European 
Convention on Human Rights [ECHR]) (4 November 1950; Eur TS 5, 213 UNTS 222; entered into force 3 
September 1953); Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment: Havana Charter 
for an International Trade Organization (the Havana Charter), UN Conference on Trade and 
Employment, UN Doc 1948 II.D.4.1 (1948). 
34 e.g. CETA (n 2 above) Preamble, Chapter 24 (Article 2), and Chapter 25 (Article X.4). 
35 FTA (n 3 above) Chapter 8 (Articles 8.1(2)) and Chapter 13 (Article 13.2). 
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and expressly. Simply, the CETA and FTA do not balance the right to regulate against the state’s 
responsibilities to protect foreign investors. 
 
Nevertheless, the Commission has claimed that the CETA and FTA safeguard the right to 
regulate by a series of textual clarifications, drawn mainly from the U.S. model of ISDS since the 
early 2000s.36 For example,37 the CETA and FTA have moderating language for one foreign 
investor right: the right to (generous) compensation for any general regulation treated by the 
arbitrators as an indirect expropriation.38 This language supports, to an uncertain degree, the 
state’s regulatory flexibility in relation to its obligation to pay compensation for expropriation, 
but is also limited for a range of reasons discussed in more detail elsewhere.39 For example, the 
moderating language does not apply to all of the foreign investor rights in the treaty, including 
the one that has been used most frequently, to date, by arbitrators in ordering compensation for 
foreign investors. Also, the Commission’s approach keeps interpretive power in the hands of 
ISDS arbitrators who have only very rarely accepted a general balancing of foreign investor 
rights against the state’s right to regulate or the rights of other actors.40 If the Commission 
wanted to affirm the right to regulate, it would need to do so clearly, for all the treaty’s 
obligations for states and in all areas of decision-making. That is has not done so speaks 
volumes. 
 
I turn now to the issue of foreign investor responsibilities. While foreign investors enjoy a wide 
range of powerful rights in ISDS, virtually as a rule they have no corresponding and actionable 
responsibilities to respect international standards. There are different ways to address this 
imbalance in the allocation of rights and responsibilities. For example, as a limited starting 
point, the treaties could allow states to bring claims against a foreign investor that initiated a 
claim in circumstances where the investor has not met a basic standard of appropriate conduct. 
This would still not be formally balanced because it would not give the state a right, alongside 
that of foreign investors, to initiate an ISDS proceeding. Also, it would not give any rights to 
private parties who are harmed seriously by a foreign investor and denied justice in the host 
state’s courts. Yet, there is no sign that even this modest step has been pursued by the 
Commission or any other Western governmental actor playing a major role in pushing for 
investment treaties. 
 
Similarly, in the CETA and FTA, there is no indication of foreign investors being held to 
actionable responsibilities, as a balance against their elaborate rights. The resulting imbalance is 
                                                          
36 TTIP consultation text (n 1 above) 2. 
37 The other main examples relate to the CETA and FTA’s language on fair and equitable treatment, which 
is discussed in more detail below, and to the use of exceptions, reservations, and carve-outs. For a 
discussion of why the Commission’s approach to these issues is dangerous or misleading, from the 
perspective of balancing the state’s right to regulate, see G. Van Harten, “Reforming the System of 
International Investment Dispute Settlement” in C.L. Lim (ed) Alternative Visions in the International 
Law on Foreign Investment: Essays in Honour of M. Sornarajah (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming). 
38 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.11. 
39 e.g. Van Harten (n 23 above) 93-95. 
40 Van Harten, Sovereign Choices and Sovereign Constraints (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 89-
104. 
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especially acute because of the lack of a requirement in either agreement for foreign investors to 
go to a state’s domestic courts before resorting to ISDS. The duty to resort to local remedies, 
where they offer justice and are reasonably-available, applies customarily in international law 
and in other international courts and tribunals where individuals can bring claims against a 
state.41 The Commission’s approach—building on the unfortunate Western European legacy of 
imbalanced investment treaties—allows foreign investors to bring ISDS claims without resorting 
to domestic courts, regardless of whether the courts in question offer justice. In turn, the 
Commission’s approach implies, absurdly, that domestic courts fail to offer justice in all 
countries. Likewise, this approach implies, also absurdly, that ISDS is independent and fair in 
the manner of a court, which it clearly is not. 
 
Why should foreign investors be relieved of the customary duty to go to domestic courts, without 
foreign investors even having to show that the courts do not offer justice? One might worry that 
domestic courts could take too long or are otherwise inadequate to protect foreign investors. If 
that is a pressing concern, then why not replace courts with arbitrators for everyone? Clearly, 
others—whether foreigners or nationals in a country—may suffer as much or indeed far more 
than a foreign investor. To pose the question reveals the radical proposition lying behind ISDS: 
the replacement of domestic courts with an exceptionally-powerful adjudicative system available 
to foreign investors only. In short, the Commission’s approach in the CETA and FTA, reflecting 
the U.S. model of ISDS, establishes that foreign investors—unlike anyone else—should have 
access to ISDS and then, on top of it, that they should be excused from having to show that 
domestic courts are inadequate in any way.  
 
These issues also raise broader questions about the balancing of rights and responsibilities. In 
particular, what if domestic courts are inadequate to protect victims of foreign investors? One 
can imagine scenarios in which someone may suffer greatly because of the misconduct of a 
foreign investor. Yet such actors would be limited to domestic courts with no right to initiate an 
international claim and to obtain public compensation. A quick example should hammer home 
the imbalance. In the era of ISDS, a foreign national who is tortured by state officials cannot 
bring an international claim against the state, at least without going first to domestic courts.42 
However, the foreign national could bring an ISDS claim if he or she owned assets in the state—
and qualified as a foreign investor—but in that case only to the extent that the torture affected 
his or her position as an asset owner not a human being. In contrast, if a foreign investor’s 
personnel were to torture its domestic employees with the state’s collaboration, none of the 
employees could bring an international claim against the company or its officers. Likewise, the 
employees could not bring a claim against the state, for failing to protect them without going to 
domestic courts first. 
 
                                                          
41 e.g. S. D’Ascoli and K.M. Scherr, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the International 
Law Doctrine and its Application in the Specific Context of Human Rights Protection” European 
University Institute (EUI) Working Paper LAW No. 2007/02 (2007). 
42 e.g. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, GA 
Res. 39/46, annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984); 1465 UNTS 85 (entered 
into force 26 June 1987), Articles 21(c) and 22(4)(b). 
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This set-up is a profoundly imbalanced elevation of foreign investors’ rights and protections 
over everyone else’s. The CETA and the FTA endorse the arrangement by not incorporating any 
actionable responsibilities for foreign investors. They do not even incorporate a duty to exhaust 
local remedies before the foreign investor can bring an ISDS claim asserting its powerful rights. 
 
III. Micro-level variations 
 
In this section, I highlight some significant variations between the CETA and FTA. By 
significant, I mean variations that appear to mark an ambiguity in the Commission’s ISDS 
preferences. As highlighted in the discussion, some of the variations between the CETA and FTA 
are also distinct from the U.S. model of ISDS. The assessment is intended to capture most such 
variations, but it is not a comprehensive analysis of all of the significant variations between the 
CETA and FTA or between these agreements and the U.S. model. 
 
A. Foreign investor rights 
 
1. Definition of “investment” 
 
a. Breadth of the definition 
 
The CETA and FTA define investment in essentially the same way. Both definitions are wide-
ranging, as typical in bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements allowing for ISDS, such 
as NAFTA. Thus, both agreements focus on protecting asset owners in general. They are not 
limited simply to investment in the sense of capital committed to a risky venture in the 
expectation of profit. 
 
The FTA definition43 is somewhat broader on paper than the CETA definition44 because it 
specifically includes “goodwill” and to “licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights 
conferred pursuant to applicable domestic law, including any concessions to search for, 
cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources”; on the latter element, the CETA has a similar 
clause that refers to concessions and contracts. 
 
Based on the record of ISDS awards, these differences in language are minor because other 
aspects of the definition of investment lend themselves to capturing broad notions of asset 
ownership. For example, the CETA definition includes “[e]very kind of asset that an investor 
owns or controls, directly or indirectly” and the FTA definition includes “every kind of asset 
which is owned, directly or indirectly or controlled, directly or indirectly by investors”. 
 
b. Pro-investor approach to the Salini criteria 
 
                                                          
43 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.1. 
44 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.3. 
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Interestingly, the CETA and FTA both qualify the definition of investment by incorporating, as 
an optional reference for an ISDS tribunal, aspects of the so-called Salini criteria.45 These 
criteria were adopted in early ISDS awards and applied by some ISDS tribunals as a way to 
orient and limit the concept of investment in investment treaties. 
 
In particular, the CETA applies only to an asset: “that has the characteristics of an investment, 
which include a certain duration and other characteristics such as the commitment of capital or 
other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk”.46 Similarly, the FTA 
applies only to an asset: “that has the characteristics of an investment, including such 
characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, 
the assumption of risk, or a certain duration”.47 A significant difference between these 
definitions is that the CETA appears to require only one mandatory characteristic—“a certain 
duration”—and lays out the other three characteristics as examples for ISDS arbitrators to 
consider. The FTA is even more liberal because it lists all four characteristics merely as examples 
for ISDS arbitrators to consider. 
 
Most importantly, the CETA and FTA both move away from past ISDS awards that applied these 
characteristics—i.e. the Salini criteria—as mandatory and cumulative aspects of the concept of 
investment. Also, the CETA and FTA would drop one of the Salini criteria: the requirement that 
an asset, to qualify as an investment, must contribute to the development of the host country’s 
economy. 
 
By altering the Salini criteria in these ways, the CETA and the FTA cast aside even the limited 
constraints on the concept of investment, as applied by some ISDS arbitrators. In doing so, they 
evidently endorse the preference of some ISDS arbitrators not to apply the Salini criteria, or to 
treat the criteria as optional guidelines rather than mandatory requirements.48 In either case, 
the CETA and FTA endorse an approach that obviously favours claimants. In other words, the 
Commission, Singapore, and Canada have codified the investor-friendly approach to the 
definition of investment that has emerged from the record of ISDS awards.  
 
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
 
The most important lesson to draw from the Commission’s approach to fair and equitable 
treatment in the CETA and FTA is that the Commission appears committed to expanding ISDS 
arbitrator power, even compared to the U.S. approach to this foreign investor right. As outlined 
below, the codification of some of the most expansive concepts imported by arbitrators into the 
concept of fair and equitable treatment goes beyond the U.S. model or, for that matter, Canada’s 
past approach.49 Thus, it appears that the Commission was the driver of the change. 
                                                          
45 O.E. García-Bolívar, “Defining an ICSID Investment: Why Economic Development Should be the Core 
Element” Investment Treaty News (13 April 2012). 
46 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.3. 
47 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.1(1). 
48 García-Bolívar (n 45 above). 
49 Canada’s treaties providing for ISDS have followed the U.S. approach by clarifying, since the early 
2000s when the issue was raised in response to early NAFTA awards, that fair and equitable treatment is 
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a. Relatively expansive approach 
 
The most widely-invoked right of foreign investors under investment treaties is “fair and 
equitable treatment”.50 This concept has been given a range of different readings—often very 
expansive—by ISDS arbitrators.51 
 
In the U.S. model of ISDS, as adopted since the early 2000s, an attempt was made to rein in 
ISDS arbitrators by limiting the concept to the meaning of the minimum standard of treatment 
in customary international law.52 This attempt has had only limited success. Success has been 
limited because ISDS arbitrators overwhelmingly adopted a relaxed standard of proof for 
foreign investors, when they are required to establish an evolution of the customary minimum 
standard, by relieving them of the usual onus to provide evidence of state practice and opinio 
juris in order to establish an evolution of customary international law.53 
 
The CETA and FTA are more expansive in their approach to fair and equitable treatment than 
the U.S. model of ISDS. Neither agreement clearly restricts ISDS arbitrators to applying the 
conventionally-understood concept of the minimum standard in customary international law. 
Instead, they allow ISDS arbitrators to apply some of the novel concepts that were read into the 
concept of fair and equitable treatment by ISDS arbitrators in numerous decisions since the 
foreign investor lawsuits began to explode in the late 1990s.54 Thus, the CETA and FTA in effect 
codify core features of the arbitrators’ adventurous approach to foreign investor rights. 
 
This aspect of the CETA and FTA is perhaps the most important issue on which the 
Commission’s approach differs from the U.S. model. In its approach to fair and equitable 
treatment, the Commission clearly has gone further in favour of foreign investor rights than the 
U.S. model. 
 
b. Lack of clarity in the closure of the list of components 
 
Additionally, the CETA and FTA definitions of fair and equitable treatment are both based on a 
list of components.55 Any of the components on the list may give rise to a breach of fair and 
equitable treatment. In both agreements, the list is essentially the same; both agreements 
include the components of denial of justice, fundamental breach of due process, manifest 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
limited to the meaning of the minimum standard of treatment in customary international law. That said, 
in some of Canada’s treaties, this clarifying language is undermined by a most-favoured-nation treatment 
loophole. G. Van Harten, “The Canada-China FIPPA: Its Uniqueness and Non-Reciprocity” (2013) 51 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3, 27-34 and Annex 1. 
50 Van Harten (n 40 above) 101-103. 
51 Ibid, 102. 
52 e.g. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, 19 USCS S. 4011 (2005) 
(CAFTA), Article 10.5(2). 
53 M. Porterfield, “A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals” Investment Treaty News (22 March 2013). 
54 Van Harten (n 40 above) 102. 
55 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.9; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.4. 
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arbitrariness, and abusive or bad faith conduct. The CETA adds to this list the component of 
targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds. 
 
The use of a list to lay out components of the foreign investor right to fair and equitable 
treatment has the potential to limit the meaning given to that right by ISDS arbitrators. 
However, the CETA and, to an apparently lesser extent the FTA, have a significant loophole 
because they do not make crystal clear that the list is closed. For example, the CETA does not 
say that the right to fair and equitable treatment is breached “only” when one of the components 
on the list is breached.56 This lack of clarity gives an opportunity for ISDS arbitrators to continue 
their adventurous approach to the concept of fair and equitable treatment by adding new 
components to the list. 
 
The FTA has somewhat stronger language to limit the open-endedness of the list. The FTA says 
that treatment not included in the list can constitute a breach of fair and equitable treatment 
“where the Parties [to the treaty] have so agreed”.57 By comparison, the equivalent clause in the 
CETA adds to the list of illustrative breaches “any further elements of the fair and equitable 
treatment obligation adopted by the Parties”.58 Thus, the CETA and FTA both leave interpretive 
room for arbitrators to incorporate new components to the concept of fair and equitable 
treatment, although the FTA is somewhat clearer in conveying that arbitrators are expected to 
apply the concept only as defined in the list. 
 
c. Codification of the novel component of “legitimate expectations” 
 
On the other hand, the FTA is somewhat more expansive than the CETA in a different aspect of 
its approach to fair and equitable treatment. The FTA includes one of the most novel concepts 
read into the right to fair and equitable treatment by ISDS arbitrators. The concept is “legitimate 
expectations”, which has been used widely by arbitrators to condemn countries and order 
compensation for foreign investors. 
 
The FTA is more expansive than the CETA in this respect because it puts the concept of 
legitimate expectations on the list of components of fair and equitable treatment.59 In contrast, 
the CETA allows the arbitrators to take into account the concept of legitimate expectations when 
applying other components of fair and equitable treatment.60 Both agreements give the 
arbitrators a licence in the treaty itself to rely on the concept of legitimate expectations, but the 
FTA appears to do so more broadly than the CETA. 
 
3. Full protection and security 
 
The CETA and FTA also follow the U.S. model on the related right of foreign investors to “full 
protection and security” by limiting the concept to the physical security of investors and 
                                                          
56 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.9(2). 
57 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.4(3). 
58 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.9(2)(f). 
59 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.4(2)(e). 
60 CETA (n 2 above) Article X-9(4). 
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investments.61 The CETA and FTA also include a clause, again consistent with the U.S. model, 
that precludes ISDS arbitrators from finding a breach of “full protection and security” or “fair 
and equitable treatment” based on a decision by the arbitrators that a country breached another 
provision in the trade agreement or a separate international agreement.62 The latter clause 
would seem unnecessary, except that some arbitrators have taken this remarkably expansive 
approach in past awards. 
 
4. Codification of an “umbrella clause” 
 
The FTA—but not the CETA—includes a type of “umbrella clause”. That is, it incorporates other 
obligations of the host country into the foreign investor’s rights under the FTA and thus subjects 
those other obligations to ISDS. In particular, the FTA states that a country must not “frustrate 
or undermine” a specific and clear commitment in a contractual obligation that is owed to a 
foreign investor.63 This version of an umbrella clause is more limited than umbrella clauses in 
some other investment treaties, but it remains potentially very expansive in that it constitutes 
ISDS as a parallel system of enforcement for any contract concluded by the state. 
 
This aspect of the FTA goes beyond the U.S. model, as reflected in NAFTA, which does not 
incorporate an umbrella clause. That said, many U.S. bilateral investment treaties include a 
broadly-worded umbrella clause.64 By going beyond the CETA, the FTA signals the 
Commission’s willingness to accept this expansive aspect of foreign investor rights. 
 
5. Performance requirements 
 
A prohibition on performance requirements typically blocks countries from requiring foreign 
investors to use local goods or local suppliers, or to transfer technology, as potential conditions 
for being allowed to enter the country. The NAFTA prohibition on performance requirements, 
for example, has been used successfully by U.S. investors to resist research and development 
requirements in Canada’s offshore oil sector.65 
 
The U.S. model of ISDS includes an extensive prohibition on performance requirements and 
subjects that prohibition to ISDS and state-state enforcement.66 The CETA has a detailed 
prohibition on performance requirement, but subjects it to state-state enforcement only, not 
ISDS.67 In contrast, the FTA appears not to have any detailed prohibition on performance 
requirements. Thus, the CETA—in comparison to the FTA—tracks more closely the U.S. model 
on this issue but does not go all the way to adopting the U.S. model.  
 
                                                          
61 CETA (n 2 above) Article X-9(5); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.4(4). 
62 CETA (n 2 above) Article X-9(6); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.4(6). 
63 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.5(5). 
64 K. Yannaca-Small, “Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements” in International 
Investment Law: Understanding Concepts and Tracking Innovations (Paris: OECD, 2008) 115. 
65 Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v Canada (Decision on Liability and 
Quantum [Public Version]) (22 May 2012).   
66 e.g. NAFTA (n 15 above) Article 1106. 
67 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.5. 
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6. National treatment 
 
As mentioned earlier, the CETA includes market access obligations. It does so by including the 
terms “establishment”, “acquisition”, and “expansion” in the list of foreign investment activities 
to which the CETA’s national treatment obligation applies.68 The comparative list in the FTA is 
limited to post-establishment activities of foreign investors.69 Both agreements also have 
extensive reservations and schedules that carve out certain activities from the national 
treatment obligation.70 A comparative analysis of these reservations and schedules is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
 
7. Market access 
 
On market access, the European Commission went further in its commitments in the CETA than 
in the FTA. However, it did not go as far in either agreement as the U.S. model would typically 
include, especially by subjecting market access obligations to ISDS. In the CETA, market access 
is linked to state-state enforcement processes only. In particular, market access is subject to 
detailed disciplines—derived from World Trade Organization (WTO) law—that are made 
enforceable through state-state dispute settlement but not ISDS.71 In contrast to the CETA, the 
FTA states that its investment chapter applies to investments “made… in accordance with the 
applicable laws”, which is a conventional way to exclude market access from disciplines under 
the investment chapter.72 
 
8. Forum-shopping 
 
The CETA and the FTA take modest steps to limit forum-shopping. Both agreements allow an 
investor to bring a claim only if the investor has “substantial business operations” in the home 
state (i.e. in the jurisdiction of which the investor claims to be a national under the treaty).73 
This is only a modest limitation on forum-shopping because it does not require the investor to 
have its headquarters or main base of operations in the home state. Thus, in both agreements, 
ISDS lawsuits have been facilitated for transnational corporations or individuals that have 
multiple individual or corporate nationalities. Either type of actor can bring an ISDS lawsuit 
under the relevant agreement if it has “substantial” business activities in one of the relevant 
jurisdictions, even if that jurisdiction is not their “home” or “dominant” jurisdiction. 
 
9. ISDS and financial services 
 
The CETA extends ISDS to the agreement’s chapter on financial services,74 whereas the FTA 
does not. This extension leads to a complex interaction between the CETA’s investment and 
                                                          
68 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.6(1). 
69 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.3(1). 
70 e.g. CETA (n 2 above) Article X.14; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.3(2). 
71 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.4. 
72 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9(2)(1). 
73 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.3. 
74 CETA (n 2 above) Chapter 15 (Article 1(3) and (4)). 
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financial services chapters. A close analysis of the interaction is beyond the scope of this paper. 
The essential point is that the CETA is similar to the U.S. model, which extends ISDS to its 
chapter on financial services, albeit to a lesser degree than the CETA.75 As a result, the CETA 
clearly expands the obligations assumed by Canada in the regulation of financial institutions 
and services, by importing more obligations than NAFTA—such as fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security—from the investment chapter into the financial services 
chapter.76 
 
10. Other foreign investor rights 
 
The CETA and FTA contain a range of other foreign investor rights, including a right to generous 
compensation for losses77  and expropriation78 and a right to make free capital transfers.79 The 
two deals do not vary markedly in this respect and the rights in question are also typical of the 
U.S. approach. One possibly significant variation is that a carve-out from the right to make free 
capital transfers in the FTA appears broader than the comparable carve-out in the CETA80 (and 
NAFTA81) because, in the FTA, the carve-out includes exceptions on social security, public 
pensions, and taxation.82 
 
B. Provision for ISDS 
 
There are micro-level variations between the CETA and FTA in their approach to ISDS. 
However, these variations do not alter the overall assessment of the Commission’s approach to 
ISDS on the criteria of independence, fairness, openness, and balance, as laid out earlier in this 
paper. Further, on nearly all key issues, the Commission’s approach to ISDS tracks the U.S. 
model. 
 
1. Executive power over ISDS 
 
The CETA and FTA give key powers in ISDS to the Secretary-General of ICSID in Washington 
D.C. These powers include the critical power to appoint ISDS arbitrators when the disputing 
parties do not or fail to agree on an arbitrator, the power to appoint arbitrators outside of the 
roster set by the Parties to the agreement, and the power to decide all conflict of interest 
challenges against an arbitrator.83 The assignment of these powers to an executive official 
instead of a judicial actor is a key reason why ISDS does not to satisfy basic requirements of 
judicial independence. The assignment of these powers to the Secretary-General of ICSID 
follows the U.S. model and, on this issue, it demonstrates the Commission’s willingness to 
accept U.S. evident preference in the allocation of executive power in ISDS. 
                                                          
75 NAFTA (n 15 above) Article 1401(2). 
76 CETA (n 2 above) Chapter 15 (Article 1(3) and (4)). 
77 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.10; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.5. 
78 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.11; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.6. 
79 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.12; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.7. 
80 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.12(4). 
81 NAFTA (n 15 above) Article 1109(4). 
82 FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.7(2). 
83 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.25; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.21. 
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2. Arbitrator expertise and experience 
 
The CETA and FTA limit the expertise or experience of ISDS arbitrators to the fields of public 
international law and, especially, “international investment law”. The FTA requires arbitrators 
to have knowledge or experience in “the settlement of disputes under international investment 
agreements”,84 while the CETA states that  it is “desirable” for arbitrators to have expertise or 
experience in international trade law and “the resolution of disputes arising under international 
investment or international trade agreements”.85 
 
Thus, both agreements signal that future arbitrators will come from the existing “club” of 
arbitrators whose decisions have taken investment treaties in an investor-friendly direction 
since the late 1990s. If anything, the Commission’s approach to ISDS signals an interest in 
protecting the role of the existing ISDS industry, based mainly in major law firms in the Western 
Europe and North America. 
 
3. Vetting of claims 
 
The CETA and FTA—once again, like the U.S. model—include a preliminary review mechanism 
to vet claims that are manifestly without legal merit86 or that are unfounded as a matter of law.87 
Both agreements give this review role to the ISDS arbitrators, thus assigning the power to vet 
claims to decision-makers with a direct financial interest—because they are paid by the hour or 
day—in seeing the claim proceed. 
 
4. Cost shifting 
 
Unlike the U.S. model of ISDS, the CETA and the FTA provide for costs to be awarded to the 
losing side in ISDS.88 This provision would typically work in favour of the party that has more 
resources in the litigation because that party confronts less financial pressure associated with 
ISDS litigation. Thus, the provision appears to work in favour of large corporations and wealthy 
individuals relative to other foreign investors and many countries. It also appears to work in 
favour of large countries relative to small foreign investors and smaller countries.  
 
5. Other moderating language 
 
Again tracking the U.S. approach, the CETA and FTA have limiting provisions for the foreign 
investor right to compensation for expropriation. These provisions are essentially the same in 
both agreements. In the CETA, there is a significant risk that these limiting provisions will be 
undermined by the deal’s approach to most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment. The is a complex 
point, elaborated elsewhere. Essentially, in contrast to the FTA (which does not have a general 
                                                          
84 CETA (n 2 above) Article 9.21(6). 
85 FTA (n 3 above) Article X.25(5). 
86 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.29; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.23. 
87 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.30; FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.24. 
88 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.36(5); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.29. 
18 
 
most-favoured-nation treatment clause in its investment chapter), the CETA uses qualified 
language when it purports to preclude the importation into the CETA—using the principle of 
MFN treatment—of additional substantive rights of foreign investors treaties with third states. 
 
The CETA and the FTA also have special provisions on foreign investor rights and ISDS in the 
context of debt restructuring or a monetary crisis.89 These provisions are complex and a 
comparative analysis of them is beyond the scope of this paper. A general issue is that both deals 
continue to subject sovereign decisions during a financial crisis to review by ISDS arbitrators, 
albeit it to varying degrees. 
 
6. Statements of interpretation 
 
Again following the U.S. model, the CETA and FTA allow for the Parties (i.e. states parties) to 
the agreement to issue interpretations of the agreement that are binding on arbitrators.90 This 
device is potentially useful to rein in arbitrator adventurism; that said, the device has been 
available for over 20 years under NAFTA and has only been used twice.91 On that basis, it should 
not be considered a significant limitation on arbitrator power. As discussed earlier in this paper, 
other aspects of the CETA and FTA indicate that the Commission is quite content with the ISDS 
arbitrators’ expansive approaches to foreign investor rights, especially with respect to legitimate 
expectations as an expansive component of fair and equitable treatment. 
 
7. Acknowledgement of regulatory chill 
 
There is a notable variation from the U.S. approach in the CETA but not the FTA. The CETA’s 
provision on the arbitrators’ power to award damages to foreign investors includes a clause that 
I have not seen in any investment treaty. The clause says that, in calculating monetary damages, 
the arbitrators shall reduce the damages to account for “any… repeal or modification of the 
measure”.92 Thus, the CETA appears to establish an incentive for states to change their decisions 
in order to appease a foreign investor (who has brought an ISDS claim) as a means to limit the 
state’s exposure to potentially massive liability at the hands of the arbitrators. Put differently, 
this clause in the CETA appears to institutionalize the ISDS dynamic of “regulatory chill”. That 
said, compared to the chilling pressure that ISDS can bring to bear on states in general, this 
aspect of the CETA seems to be more an acknowledgement than a significant exacerbation of the 
pressure. 
 
8. Survival clause 
 
The CETA and FTA include a survival clause—which extends the agreements’ protections for 
foreign investors in the event of termination of the agreement.93 Also, neither of the agreements 
allows for termination of its investment chapter, or its provisions on ISDS, separately form the 
                                                          
89 CETA (n 2 above) Annex X; FTA (n 3 above) Articles 9.7(3) and 17.9. 
90 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.27(2); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.22(3). 
91 Free Trade Commission (n 24 above). 
92 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.36(3). 
93 CETA (n 2 above) Article X.08(2); FTA (n 3 above) Article 9.9. 
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overall trade agreement. Thus, significant economic and political costs would be attached to any 
future decision to pull out of ISDS once the agreement has been ratified and put into force. 
 
This approach to locking in ISDS commitments, by making them part of a larger trade 
agreement, is new in the European context, which previously limited ISDS to bilateral 
investment treaties that can be terminated without affecting trade commitments. The approach 
based on embedding of ISDS in a trade agreement reflects the U.S. model. 
 
The survival clauses and informal lock-ins are particularly anti-democratic aspects of ISDS, 
albeit typical to the European and U.S. model since the 1970s. These aspects are atypical in the 
CETA and potentially the TTIP in that that they are being extended, beyond NAFTA, to relations 
among developed countries. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The CETA and FTA demonstrate the Commission’s willingness to accept ISDS—based on the 
model long pushed by Western European countries for developing and transition countries—
that is flawed due to its lack of independence, fairness, and balance. The Commission’s approach 
to ISDS, as represented by the CETA and FTA, does not ensure basic safeguards of judicial 
independence and procedural fairness. It does not affirm clearly the state’s right to regulate. It 
does not introduce actionable responsibilities for foreign investors or even require foreign 
investors to resort to domestic courts unless they have been shown not to offer justice. The only 
notable improvement in the CETA and FTA approach to ISDS, compared to the historical 
Western European model, is its greater provision for openness.  
 
A micro-level assessment of the CETA and FTA text highlighted some variations between the 
two agreements that raised uncertainties about the Commission’s actually preferred approach. 
Yet, overwhelmingly, the micro-level assessment demonstrated the Commission’s willingness to 
accept the U.S. model of ISDS. Most importantly, the assessment did not affect the overall 
conclusion n that the Commission has endorsed an ISDS model that does not satisfy basic 
criteria of independence, fairness, and balance. 
 
By including ISDS in the CETA and FTA, as forerunners of a TTIP, the Commission would make 
the problems of ISDS much worse. The Commission aims to expand and lock in a deeply flawed 
system of dispute resolution—premised on the special privileging and subsidizing of large 
companies and very wealthy individuals, with lucrative returns also for ISDS lawyers and 
arbitrators—so that it covers most of the world economy. 
 
